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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen momentous changes throughout the Western
Hemisphere and the world in the liberalization of trade policies and the
opening of foreign markets. In Latin America this change has been
manifested through a mass exodus from inward-looking policies character-
ized by import-substitution, industrialization, and nationalization, to the
opening of markets like a parting of the Red Sea-leading to a economically
stable promised land. Steps towards integration have been taken by way of
several Latin American countries becoming members of the General
Agreement on, Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). However, the general
ineffectiveness of GAIT, and a fear of being unable to compete with other
North-South agreements in Europe and Asia' has led to a notable increase
in the number and quality of regional trade agreements. Agreements such
as the Andean Pact and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)
represent the evolution to subregionalization, which could some day be the
catalyst to multilateral trade throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Nevertheless, in this time of open markets, visibly booming trade, and
optimism towards free trade throughout the Americas there continues to exist
bountiful evidence that Latin American countries are still clinging to
protectionism. Undisputedly, markets of Latin America have grown
tremendously and trade between these countries has significantly increased.
Yet, Latin America is still a long way from being a region of truly free trade
due to the continued practice of protectionist measures made manifest in a
* J.D. 1999, University of Georgia School of Law.
Emilio J. Cardenas, The Regional Approach to Hemispheric Integration: A Modular
Road Towards Free Trade, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 49, 62 n.8 (1994).
389
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
m61ange of mediums.
Against this background, an analysis of trade policies in Latin America
will be undertaken, examining how far trade liberalization has come, where
it currently stands and what lies ahead. Specifically, this note will study
Mercosur as an example of a regional free-trade organization and as an
emerging Customs Union. Further, it will analyze measures taken by the
trade union and by the member countries to facially lower trade barriers
while simultaneously working to keep other trade barriers in place. This
note will argue that although Mercosur countries have taken tremendous
steps toward trade liberalization, substantial evidence of residual protection-
ism still exists.
Finally, this note will evaluate how such protectionist measures have
affected these trade regions and agreements, and how they may affect the
future of Latin American trade. In making this evaluation, the note will
address the possibility of hemispheric free trade in light of the Free Trade of
the Americas agreement.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Commencing in the 1950s, integration in trade policy among Latin
American countries could generally be characterized by a high level of tariff
and non-tariff protection barriers accompanied by other protectionist
measures designed to exclude extra-regional imports.2 These barriers were
erected to protect national industries from foreign competition while
promoting self-sufficiency in meeting the demands of the country and, to
some degree, the region. Accordingly, increases in trade were to come about
through the creation and allocation of industries nationally and regionally,
while simultaneously and purposefully constructing barriers against outside
industrialized countries (which often included that country's major trading
partners). 3
Instead of fostering economic self-sufficiency and promoting regional
growth, these import-substitution policies were the cause of unproductive
2 See Emilio J. Cardenas, supra note 1, at 50.
See Jason R. Wolff, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities for
Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
103 (1996). For example, 1950's Peronista Argentina looked to import-substitution, high
external tariffs, and nationalization of industry to provide national stability and growth.
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industries and ineffective markets.4 In the wake of disappointment, Latin
American countries attempted to purge past dogmas and move towards more
market-oriented policies. This attempt was evidenced in the signing of
various treaties including the Treaty of Montevideo that created the Latin
American Free Trade Association ("LAFTA").5 Other agreements included
the Andean Pact (1969),6 the Caribbean Common Market ("CARICOM")
(1973), 7 and the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo establishing the Latin American
Integration Association ("LAIA").8 Although these agreements successfully
reduced tariffs on non-competitive goods, leading to slight increases in intra-
regional trade, these pacts were insufficient steps towards integration because
their basic grounding was in protectionist policies.9 Despite the treaties,
Latin American states continued to shelter domestic trade.'0  In fact,
LAFTA and the other initial agreements and attempts at creating trade were
merely extensions of import substitution policies from the national to the
regional level. These inceptive agreements not only proved to be economi-
cally flawed, but were "quickly co-opted to protectionist interest who had
opposed economic liberalization at the national level" from the beginning."
In 1980, LAIA began to re-launch integration through a legal model that
established a multilateral system through unilateral negotiations, which
4 See Cardenas, supra note 1, at 51.
' See Montevideo Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin
American Free-Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, Arg.-Bol.-Braz.-Chili-Colom.-Ecuador-Mex.-
Para.-Peru.-Uru.-Venez., reprinted in Amos J. Peaske, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS 1090 (revised 3rd ed., 1974) [hereinafter LAFTA Treaty].
6 See The Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910
(1969); The agreement was originally signed by Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru
within context of LAFTA to establish a common program in the Andean states for the
regulation of foreign investment. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 126 n.20.
7 See The Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033
(1973) (entered into force Aug. 1, 1973) [hereinafter CARICOM]. CARICOM replaced the
Caribbean Free Trade Association ("CARIFTA"), as a more intensive effort toward regional
integration, seeking economic integration of member states in the form of a region-wide
common market, through strengthening and coordinating economic and trade relations among
member states and through the equitable sharing of benefits. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 126
n.21.
'See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Assoc., Aug. 12,
1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter LAIA].
' See Marta Haines-Ferrari, Mercosur, A New Model of Latin American Economic
Integration?, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (1993).
1o Id. at 417.
Wolff, supra note 3, at 104.
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initiated bilateral and multilateral discriminatory economic blocks.12 It was
under this framework that countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
began to establish bilateral agreements according to national policies, while
preserving sovereign governance over their own foreign economic policy.' 3
Nonetheless, LAIA continued to implement LAFTA's import-substitution
policies regionally and countries continued to favor world market linkag-
es.' 4 Both of these factors contributing to the failure to form regional areas
of economic preference.' 5
Frustration with the currently held policies, increased debt as a result of
the oil crisis' halt on exports, and a broadened technological gap all
contributed to Latin America's inability to compete in the world market.'
6
It was within this context that Latin American countries began to search for
an enlightened, more innovative solution. 7 Two of the atoning countries,
Argentina and Brazil, sought to reshape development strategies and overcome
international economic marginalization by redefining their relationship with
one another. With a strategy to increase and enhance domestic production
through integration, these countries set out to create a new framework to
widen commercial linkages and develop faltering commercial networks. 8
A. Mercosur Background
The Asuncion Treaty, as signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay on March 24, 1991, posited the establishment of a Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR) by December 31, 1994.19 The agreement
was the outcome of previous regional trade agreements which had taken
place in Latin America, including a series of sectoral protocols between
Argentina and Brazil such as the Declaration of Buenos Aires and the
,2 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 418.
'3 See id.
,4 See id.
" See id.
16 See id. at 418-19.
," See id. at 419. See also Emilio J. Cardenas, supra note 1, at 51 (attributing the Latin
American shift from protected integration to regional trade to 1) a major shift in development
practices; 2) frustrations with GAT; and 3) a substantial increase in intra-regional
investments).
," See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 419-20.
'9 See Treaty of Asuncion Establishing a Common Market among Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, & Uruguay, Mar. 26 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Treaty of Asuncion].
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Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration (better known by its Spanish
and Portuguese acronym, "PICAB"). 20 The primary goal of PICAB was to
bolster each country's economy through increased bilateral trade.2' This
economic boost was to be accomplished through the creation of "common
economic space" which adhered strongly to the principles of gradualness and
flexibility. 22  The Argentine-Brazilian Program for Economic Integration
was to be implemented in annual stages through integrated projects that
detailed the integration process for capital goods and had different programs
for products such as automobiles and wheat. 23 The agreement also set out
to harmonize foreign trade policies in relation to third-party countries with
the objective of expanding trade. 24  The failure to harmonize disparate
economic policies, however, proved tariff reduction to be insufficient,
leading to the reinstatement of protectionist barriers.25
The PICAB was supplemented by the Treaty of Integration and Economic
Cooperation26 which sought to transform Argentina and Brazil into a
customs union by the year 1999.27 This was to be accomplished by
following the same principles of gradualness and flexibility on one hand and
economic equilibrium and symmetry on the other. The treaty established a
two-phase term for instituting the market. This two-phase term was designed
to gradually reduce non-tariff barriers and customs duties,28 coordinate
economic policies, and adopt intergovernmental systems.29
Although these agreements helped somewhat to increase and diversify
trade between the two countries, they did not bring the desired economic or
political stability. Lack of common independent institutions for the
implementation of tariff and non-tariff dismantlement proved to frustrate the
2o See Argentina-Brazil: Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration, July
29, 1986, 27 I.L.M. 901 [hereinafter 1986 Argentina-Brazil Integration Treaty].
' See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, An Assessment of Mercosur's Present Legal Framework
and Institutions and How They Effect Mercosur's Chances of Success, 6-AUT INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 14 (1993).
22 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 419.
2 See Argentina-Brazil Integration Treaty, supra note 20.
24 See id. at 903.
25 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 420.
26 See Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration, Nov. 29, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 901
[hereinafter 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty].
27 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 420.
28 See 1988 Argentine-Brazilian Common Market Treaty, supra note 26, at art. 1.
-9 Id. at arts. 4, 5.
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anticipated changes and growth.30
In July of 1990, the newly elected presidents of Argentina and Brazil,
Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello, signed the Act of Buenos
Aires which undertook to establish a bilateral common market beginning in
1995.3 ' The general guidelines for the common market called Mercosur (or
Mercosul in Portuguese) were laid out in the ALADI Economic Comple-
mentation Accord No. 14 signed in December 1990.32 Fearful of exclusion
from a common market comprised of their two biggest trading partners,
Paraguay and Uruguay joined in the Mercosur proceedings. The process of
forming a bilateral market culminated in the signing of the Treaty of
Asuncion by the four countries on March 24, 1991.33 The Treaty went into
force in November 1991.3
The Asuncion Treaty designed Mercosur to work on the principle of
reciprocity, achieving integration through a set of "coordinated, progressive
automatic reductions of customs tariffs, the elimination of non-tariff barriers
and other restrictions to trade, a common external tariff, and macroeconomic
policy coordination. '35 Mercosur initially targeted free-trade zones, then
customs unification, and finally a common market where, in addition to
customs unification, the free transfer of labor and capital across member-
nations' borders was to be made possible.36
In June 1996, Mercosur took its first steps towards widening its range, as
Chile entered into the Mercosur market by signing a free trade agreement.37
Later that year, at the Common Markets semi-annual presidential meeting,
Bolivia followed suit.38 In line with the Mercosur concept, nearly all of the
trade for both Bolivia and Chile was to be tariff-free within ten years, with
the exception of sensitive items which were to remain protected for up to
eighteen years.39
3 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 421.
3, See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 14.
32 See id.
33 See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 19.
3 See id.
" Evelina Teubal de Aihadeff, Argentina-Brazil: Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian
Integration, Introductory note, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
36 See Objectives of the Mercosur, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritz/mercosur/english/page03.html>.
3" See Now They Are Six, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 52.
-u See idL
39 See id.
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In light of a history of shots and misses, the drafters of Mercosur sought
to create a system in which problems plaguing previous attempts at free trade
could be avoided. The process of economic regional integration which was
adopted by the member countries of Mercosur was a multi-stage plan which
was to be implemented over several transitory periods.40 Each period was
to implement a more drastic step towards liberalization of trade between the
member countries.4
In the primary stage of Mercosur the parties were to adopt general rules
of origin, a system for settlement of disputes and safeguard clauses to
prevent sharp fluctuations in certain market areas.42 This first stage of
economic integration was an imperfect and awkward free trade association,
which existed from the date of the execution of the agreement until
December 31, 1994. The initial stage or "trade-opening program" called for
the end of duties and other non-tariff restrictions on trading between
Argentina and Brazil by December 31, 1994, and by December 31, 1995 for
trade with Uruguay and Paraguay.43 "Duties" include custom rights and
any tariffs on foreign trade, whether fiscal, monetary, exchange or otherwise,
other than charges and like measures corresponding to the approximate cost
of services rendered."4 Other restrictions were to include any "administra-
tive, financial, foreign exchange or other measures by which a state
unilaterally prevents or impedes reciprocal trade."4  To accomplish this
end, projects were designed to lift import duties according to a progressive,
direct, and automatic schedule which moved towards 100 percent tariff
reduction at a rate of two percent every four months until the end of the
transitory period.'
The tariff reduction schedule was not to apply to all products in the
member-state trading, as each nation was allowed to have a list of exemp-
tions on products and items considered to be "sensitive. 47 The lists of
exemptions by each state was varied, ranging from a carefully selected list
40 See Objectives of the Mercosur, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritz/mercosur/english/page03.html>.
41 See Trade Opening Program, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritzlmercosur/english/pageO5.html>.
4Z See id.
43 See id.
4 See id.
45 Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 19, at art. 3.
46 See id. at art. 4.
47 See Trade Opening Program, supra note 41.
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of 394 items protected by Argentina, to a smaller list of 324 items, hastily
put together by Brazil, to a super-inclusive Uruguayan list of 940 items.4
Each list was to be reduced ten percent upon entering the agreement and by
an additional twenty percent at the end of each calendar year for the
remainder of the first period.49 It is important to note that both the tariff
reduction schedule and the schedule to reduce the number of exemptions
were, for the most part, followed according to the mandated timetables.50
Upon entering the next stage, however, another list of exceptions was filed
by each of the countries.5
Along with protection for "sensitive" goods through exemption from the
tariff lists, the Treaty of Asuncion also provided safeguard clauses whereby
each member state could, during the transition period, impose a temporary
quota restriction on the continued importation of a good from another
member state when there was a sudden, dramatic increase in that good
caused by practices such as dumping.52 These temporary quotas were
allowed to protect a domestic market from harm or threatened damage
caused by the importation of a certain product. In considering whether
damage or a potential for harm to a product existed, an examination was
conducted on a variety of aspects, including production levels and use
capacity, employment levels, market share, extent of trade between nations
involved, and the performance of imports and exports in relation to non-
member states.53 The protected product would also benefit from the lifting
of duties and other conditions established in the program for the opening of
trade.5
The language of Annex No. IV of the Treaty of Asuncion makes clear,
however, that a quota would not be imposed when sudden, dramatic
increases in importation were due to the exporter's use of better technology
or a shift in consumer preference.55 In no case would the safeguard clauses
4 See ROBERTO DROMI, CODIGO DEL MERCOSUR 271 (Fundacion Centro de Estudios
Politicos y Administrativos 1996).
9 See Trade Opening Program, supra note 41.
'o See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 14.
' See Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, Taxation
Framework, p.2 (visited Oct. 2, 1997) <http://www.mecon/ar/invest/taxation.htm>.
5,. See Safeguard Clauses, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritz/mercosur/english/page06.html>.
53 See DROMI, supra note 48, at 278.
"4 See Safeguard Clauses, supra note 52, at 1.
5 See DROMI, supra note 48, at 278.
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extend past December 31, 1994, as the sole purpose was to aid in this
transition period.5
6
1. 1995: Customs Union
To differentiate the first stage from the second, it is essential to distinguish
the concepts of intra-zone and extra-zone trade. Intra-zone trade is trade
developed exclusively within the limits of the block, i.e. that which involves
member countries only.57 On the other hand, extra-zone trade refers to that
between the trading block and the rest of the world.58 Hence, the first stage
of trade integration, the free trade organization, involved only intra-zone
trade, without effecting the tariff level that each country in the Mercosur
maintained with the rest of the world.
The second stage of the integration set out to create a Customs Union
between the member countries. This involved an undertaking by each of the
member countries to replace their own particular tariff structure with a
structure common to the entire block.59  An extra-zone common tariff
structure was adopted by the four countries; that is, the level of protection
upon imports was to be uniform for all the countries in the Mercosur.
60
The common external tariff ('CET") was set at eleven different levels from
zero to twenty percent for most items.6 .
By establishing a common external tariff towards all products originating
in extra-zone countries, the countries of Mercosur set out to strengthen the
external competitiveness of member countries. A common external tariff
also served to nullify the need for any intra-zone tariffs. That is, the tariff
was designed to prevent leakages of products that could be imported through
the country that offered lower tariff protection.
As previously noted, all four of the countries brought with them a list of
goods which were temporarily excepted from tariff arrangements including
56 Id. at 278.
s7 See Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, supra note 51.
" Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 2.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Reid, Michael, A survey of Mercosur: What Mercosur has Done, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 12, 1996, available in_ 1996 WL 11247185.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the common external tariff.62 For example, Brazil maintains a thirty percent
tariff, apart from the CET, on personal computers.' Further exceptions
were provided for information technology and telecommunications. Each of
these industries was to have a maximum tariff of sixteen percent, converging
by 2006. In addition, Brazil and Argentina maintain differential external
tariffs on capital goods until January 1, 2002.'
Therefore, as of January 1995, all of the tariffs which existed in the
Mercosur universe could be catalogued as follows: goods subject to the
common external tariff; goods excepted from the common external tariff;
goods subject to the system of final adequacy; capital goods, informatics and
telecommunications; and goods subject to special trade policies.'
Goods Subject to the Common External Tariff. These are goods which
shall be imported in accordance with the CET reduction plan and shall be
subject to tariffs ranging from zero to twenty percent within the Mercosur
trading block.66
Goods Excepted from the Common External Tariff. Each country was
permitted to specify certain goods to which a special tariff for extra-zone
trade would apply.67 This may be above or below the CET. Argentina,
Brazil, and Uruguay were allowed to specify 300 items exempted from the
CET, while Paraguay was able to maintain 390 exceptions.69 Exceptions
to the CET generally consist of items deemed to be sensitive or otherwise
competitively deficient, such as automobile parts in Brazil.70
Goods Subject to a System of Final Adequacy. The system of final
adequacy, as agreed upon by the member countries, aims to limit the intra-
zone trade liberalization of certain groups of goods in an effort to facilitate
the adequacy of some products to the new conditions set up for the intra-
62 Id. (noting that each country was allowed to exempt 300 items (390 for Paraguay),
whose tariffs will converge through annual increases or decreases to the CET by 2001 (2006
for Uruguay and Paraguay)).
63 Id.
' Haracio A. Gigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1073, 1095 (1996).
65 See Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services for Argentina, supra note 51,
at 2-3.
66 See id. at 12.
67 See id. at 3.
6' See id.
69 See Dromi, supra note 48, at 1424.
70 See id.
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regional trade.71 As a result, the goods subject to this special regulation,
whether or not they are considered to originate in Mercosur, are subject to
payment of tariffs for intra-Mercosur trade.72 This provision was to remain
in effect until December 31, 1998.73
Goods subject to the system of final adequacy or adaptation to the Custom
Union were specified by each country, by virtue of their "sensitive"
nature.74 Argentina presented 221 products, Brazil 29, Paraguay 249, and
Uruguay 1,018 .7  These products were selected from those which were
excluded by each country from the CET and from those goods that were set
aside under the safeguard clauses.76
Capital Goods, Informatics, and Telecommunications. Excluded from the
CET are capital goods.77 These goods should converge in a lineal and
automatic manner toward a common tariff of fourteen percent by January 1,
2001.7 Paraguay and Uruguay are to do this by January 1, 2006.
Informatics and telecommunications goods are to converge lineally and
automatically on a common external tariff of fourteen percent by January 1,
2006.80
Goods Subject to Special Trade Policies. It is worthwhile to note that
there are other areas such as the sugar, textile, and automobile industries
which are subject to special rules of trade, apart from the CET."' The
commercialization of these goods within the Mercosur is supposed to be
tariff-free for products originating in the four member countries. Further-
more, a certificate of origin is required for circulation from one country into
another.8 2 Goods subject to these special trade policies will be discussed
in more depth later in the note.
"' See Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, supra note 51,
at 3.
72 See id.
13 See id.
74 See Maria De Aguinis, Can Mercosur Accede to Nafta? A Legal Perspective, 10
CONN. J. Irr'L L. 597, 617 (1995).
71 See id.
76 See id.
' See Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, supra note 51,
at 3.
78 See id.
79 id.
o Id.81 1d.
82 id.
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As a result of the harmonized tariff schedule or nomenclature that was put
into place, along with its exceptions, the amount of intra-regional tariff free
trade has greatly increased. In the summer of 1994, the amount of intra-zone
trade conducted at zero-percent tariffs was about ninety percent, while the
CET had successfully been applied to approximately eighty-five percent of
the products under the Mercosur nomenclature.8 3
The existence of a group of goods that were excepted from the CET made
it necessary to establish classes of origin for the intra-zone trade. Annex No.
II of the Treaty of Asuncion details the provisions for determining the origin
of a product which, in turn, determines its status within the intra-zone trading
regime and thus, its ability to take advantage of the intra-regional free trade
structure of Mercosur.84 Basically, for a good to obtain special trading
status it must be native; a product fully manufactured with materials
originating in one of the Mercosur countries." A good may also be
classified as native, and thus qualifying for preferential tariff treatment, if the
good, despite being manufactured with materials not originating in the
member countries, has been gufficiently transformed within the Mercosur
region so as to take on a "new identity. '  This "new identity" places the
product in a tariff position different from that of the pre-manufactured
materials.8 7 For a good to take upon a "new identity" sufficient to be
considered as originating in Mercosur, the good must undergo "a transforma-
tion." "Transformation" usually requires that the item undergo something
more than merely being assembled, packaged, or marked.88 A good will
also pass as a native good if the cost of the good plus insurance and freight
charges at the port of destination (the "c.i.f." value) of the third party country
83 Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism; Symposium: Free Trade
Areas: The Challenge and Promise of Fair vs. Free Trade; Panel V: Regionalism and the
Transfer of Sovereignty, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1096 (1996).
" See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 15.
85 See General Origin Regulations (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritz/mercosur/english/page08.html>.
6 See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 15.
87 See General Origin Regulations, supra note 85.
s See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 15; Article 1(b)(iii) of Annex II of the Asuncion Treaty,
excludes all goods whose operation simply involves "assembly, packaging, division into lots
or volumes, selection and classification, marking, the putting together of assortments of goods
or other equivalent operations or processes". Id. See also, Agreement Among the
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the United States, 30 I.L.M. 1034,
1038 (1991) [hereinafter Mercosur-U.S. Agreement].
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materials does not exceed fifty percent of the cost of the goods at the
moment it is placed on a carrier and shipped to the buyer (the "f.o.b." export
value). 9 Thus, the good will be considered as originating so long as the
extra-zone material does not exceed fifty percent of its value upon comple-
tion. In the case of capital goods eighty percent of the Mercosur added
value shall be a requirement of origin.9  While a fifty percent origin
requirement is arguably liberal compared to the origin requirements of other
trading blocks, it is nonetheless effective to protect regional goods from
extra-zone competition. Thus, by classifying a good as extra-zone based
upon its composition, states can effectively apply the CET to that item,
raising its relative price compared to an item classified as intra-regional and
thus exempt from the CET and presumably less expensive.
The rules of origin established in the Treaty of Asuncion are not set in
stone. Article 3 of Annex II states that each of the member countries may
establish, by mutual consent, specific requirements of origin which shall
prevail over general classification requirements.91 In determining the
specific requirement of origin, a state is to consider among other factors the
origin of the preponderant raw material and the parts or components which
essentially characterize the product.' By allowing each state to establish
individual rules at certain times, the Treaty of Asuncion permits a certain
degree of protectionism to be maintained or, alternatively, readily facilitates
recourse to protectionist measures.
In addition to the previous provisions taken in advance of the Customs
Union, within the Mercosur countries there exist special custom and free
trade zones. These are mentioned only to note that there are certain enclaves
within the country's general customs territory wherein rules different from
those applicable to the general customs are in force.93 Activities developed
within the special customs zones (the "AAE" or Areas Aduernas Especiales)
are subject to general tax regulations, which are more favorable than those
applicable to the rest of the national territory.94 Goods entering from the
AAE and the free trade zones into the general customs territory are subject
89 See Mercosur-U.S. Agreement, supra note 88 at Annex II, Article 2, at 1039.
90 See General Origin Regulations, supra note 85.
9' See Mercosur-U.S. Agreement, supra note 88, at 1038.
92 a
9' Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, supra note 51, at
4.
9 id.
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to the payment of the CET, or if exempted from such, the national tariff in
force, as if it were an extra-zone import.9 The only special custom zones
accepted by Mercosur are the Tierra del Fuego in Argentina and Manaos in
Brazil.96 These two zones may continue normal operations until 2013.' 7
These zones are particularly important because they facilitate different rules
and can be used by the member countries to shelter certain market areas
from intra-zone competition.
2. Common Market
The final stage in the Mercosur integration process is to become a
common market, much like the European Union. The Customs Union, with
the establishment of the CET, was designed as a step towards this ultimate
goal. A common market encompasses the free circulation of goods and
services and the settlement of a common tariff for foreign products.
Furthermore, a common market includes the free circulation of capital and
labor along with the coordination of policies to assure competitive conditions
am th ounries 98
among the countries. While the implementation of the Customs Union
has contributed towards the ultimate goal of a common market, achieving
this end will be far more difficult than the steps taken thus far. As will be
discussed below, the achievement of a common market will depend largely
on the ability and willingness of each of the member states to let go of
individual protectionist policies. This step will be much more laborious than
those previously taken because much remains to be done to cross the bridge
from a Customs Union to a common market with true free trade.
3. Administration
Although the Treaty of Asuncion and Oero Puerto Protocol do establish
the basis for the institutional Mercosur structure, practically speaking,
Mercosur's implementation lies with the individual member states. Oversight
9 Id.
96 See Free Trade Zones, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.commauritz/mercosur/anglign/pateO7.htn-d>.
97See id.
9' Mirko Schlossberg, Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of
Doing Business in Latin America: Developing Strategies, Alliances, and Markets: Mercosur
Update, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 60 (1995).
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of the administration and implementation of the Mercosur is to be carried out
by the Common Market Council and the Common Market Group, both of
which began functioning at the outset of the transition phase." At the
outset, these agencies were to function merely as temporary administrators
until more definitive institutional structures having super-national authority
were established; instead, they have remained the central administrative arm
of Mercosur.'°°
The highest-level agency is the Common Market Council (the "Council"),
which is responsible for compliance with the objects and time frames set
forth in the Treaty of Asuncion.10l The Council is comprised of the
Ministers of Foreign Relations and Economics of each of the member
states.10 2 Although the primary objective of the Council is to oversee the
implementation of Mercosur policy, it possesses minimal executory power
to enforce its directives. 10
3
The executive body of the Mercosur is the Common Market Group (the
"Group"), which consists of four individuals from each member state who
represent their respective Ministries of Foreign Relations, Economy (or its
equivalent responsible for industrial policy, foreign commerce, and/or
economic coordination), and the Central Bank." 4 The basic duties of the
Group are to procure compliance with the Treaty of Asuncion and to adopt
resolutions which implement the decisions made by the Council. 5 The
Group is also empowered to initiate practical measures for trade opening,
coordination of macroeconomic policies, and negotiation of agreements with
non-member states and international agencies.1'6 For example, under the
direction of the Council, the Group implemented the adoption of the CET by
a 1994 resolution."' 7
The Group also has the authority to organize, coordinate, and supervise
Work Subgroups and to call special meetings to deal with issues of
99 Institutional Structure, (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasne.commauritz/mercosur/english/pageO4.html>.
1o0 Id.
101 Id.
" See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 16.
'03 See Institutional Structure, supra note 99.
'" See id.
'0' See id.
' See id.
107 See DROMI, supra note 48, at 1423.
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interest."8 These work-groups are directly subordinate to the Group and
carry out the function of conducting studies on specific Mercosur concerns
and submitting these results for the consideration of the council.1 9 Current
groups seek to address such areas as commercial and custom matters,
technical standards, coordination of macroeconomic policies, and various
other areas."' The work of the groups can be classified as either prepara-
tory, which includes the requesting of participation of representatives from
the private sector, or conclusive."' This leaves the actual decision making
to the official representatives of the member states."'
While the structures are quite extensive and, compared to other such
regimes, arguably superior, the administrative structure of Mercosur has
contributed to some of the backlash in policies. Because the member
countries have refused to yield substantial powers to the Mercosur adminis-
trative bodies, implementation of the agreement remains with the national
governments and, thus, is subservient to nationalistic interests and con-
cerns."
3
4. Taxation Framework
Although the first steps toward economic integration have been taken by
way of tariff harmonization for all members of the block, this tariff
harmonization requires only that the same tax level be levied on extra-zone
imports. However, tariff harmonization does not require a harmonization of
the taxes that each country applies in terms of self-determination." 4
Consequently, unequal conditions, such as different taxation structures within
each member country, can and has led to a significant degree of difficulty
between member states. For example, under these circumstances each
subregional producer must be more sensitive to variations in its own costs
and sales prices because internal taxation in each subregion represents cost
increases or income reductions to that producer." 5 The use of internal
" See Institutional Structure, supra note 99.
'09 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See id.
13 Jorge M. Guira, Mercosur as an Instrument for Development, NAFTA: L. Bus. &
REV. AM., Summer 1997, at 53, 84.
114 Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services of Argentina, supra note 51.
"5 Id. at 4.
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direct taxes and indirect taxes such as the value added tax, taxes on gross
revenue, and assumption taxes present inevitable difficulty as well as a
potential way to protect interests. Each country can use this variance to
effectively discourage imports through increased pricing or increased
headaches to producers and exporters.
5. Antidumping and Countervailing Laws
The use of antidumping and countervailing duties to prevent or remedy
unfair trade policies has been an important issue in multilateral and regional
trade negotiations. Some view the use of such measures as a way to remedy
unfair trade practices such as dumping, a term used for the sale of goods on
a foreign market at a price which is less than that at which the product is
sold on the seller's domestic market.'1 6 Another view taken is that anti-
dumping measures and countervailing duties are politically motivated
contingency protection measures, designed to protect certain areas from
outside competition." 7  According to GATT Article VI, antidumping
measures may be applied against an imported good where it is being dumped
on the foreign market thus causing or threatening to cause "material injury
to an established industry ... or [to] materially retard[] the establishment of
a domestic industry.""' Similarly, a countervailing duty may be applied
to an imported good to offset the effects of a foreign subsidy where the
subsidy causes, or threatens to cause, injury to the domestic industry or the
potential development of such industry." 9
The constitution of Mercosur calls for the adoption of a common
commercial policy in regard to third party states whereby the member
countries promise to inhibit imports whose prices are influenced by illegal
practice such as dumping or unfair subsidies. 20 Under Decision 3/92,
member countries are required to formulate written complaints of these
practices against the particular importer or the area of industry, giving
sufficient proof of the existence of dumping and the danger or threat of
116 Gilbert R. Winham & Heather A. Grant, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties in
Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA and Beyond, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 4 (1994).
117 See id.
"8 Id. at 4.
119 See id.
120 See DROMI, supra note 48, at 1187.
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danger the importers are presenting." The Common Market Group
addresses the problem through a series of inquiries after which it may reject
the complaint or, alternatively, grant permission to the state to implement
anti-dumping or countervailing measures by way of national legislation.Y
22
While the use of such measures are legal under both GATT and the
Mercosur code, they can be and, in fact, are used primarily as protectionist
measures.
III. PROTECTIONISM IN MERCOSUR
It is undisputed that through the implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty of Asuncion and subsequent measures, the Mercosur countries and
even Mercosur as a trade regime have shed a significant degree of their
protectionist clothing, thus exposing themselves to the scorching rays of the
world market competition. The countries of Mercosur, however, have not
entered into the market without protection, as each country has applied its
own degree of protectionist sunscreen, with levels of protection ranging from
a M.P.F. ("market protection factor") of 15 to a M.P.F. of 50. Although
great strides have been made towards the liberalization of the markets of the
Mercosur countries, policies and obstacles still remain which undeniably
smell of protectionism. The test of how liberal the markets have become is
not to look at what has been accomplished but rather what remains to be
done.
A. Mercosur as a Regional Protectionist Fortress
The primary goal of Mercosur is to work towards a common market in
which each country eliminates intra-zone trade barriers (including free
circulation of services and labor between member states) while upholding the
CET to all extra-zone trade."2 As explained previously, Article I of the
Treaty of Asuncion stated that by the end of 1994, the Mercosur countries
should have had coordinated macroeconomic policies on, inter alia, foreign
trade, agriculture, industry, capital, services, customs, transportation, and
121 See id. at 1188.
12 See id. at 1188-89.
123 See Objectives of Mercosur (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritz/mercosur/english/pageO3.hml>.
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communication, fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. 24 None of
these goals were completely accomplished by the target date of December
31, 1994.125 Instead, what came into operation on January 1, 1995 was an
imperfect customs union, with the introduction of a CET being applied to
eighty-five percent of the items found in the Mercosur nomenclature.'
26
Despite the fact that full implementation of the CET is postponed until at
least the year 2006, the current use of a common external tariff of sixteen
percent while the internal trade faces a tariff of zero percent, has the effect
of encouraging intra-regional trade while discouraging trade with those
countries outside Mercosur.'27 This argument was raised by World Bank
economist Alexander J. Yeats in a recent report entitled-Does Mercosur's
Trade Performance Justify Concerns About the Global Welfare Reducing
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements? ... YES!. 128  The storm that
greeted the report prompted The Bank not to release it. However its content
was leaked to the media.' 29 In the report, Yeats alleges that Mercosur
distorts efficient trade patterns and reduces regional well-being by promoting
trade in internationally non-competitive local manufacturers within Mercosur
while discouraging the entry of better and "more efficient" goods from
outside the block. 3 Because the use of the CET actively discriminates
against those countries not lucky enough to be in the local club, it has the
potential of sheltering the region from the competition of world markets, thus
creating an enlarged protectionist fortress reminiscent of that erected by
individual states in the not so distant past.
While Article I of the Treaty of Asuncion established the basic percentage
rate and the reduction schedule of the CET, the CET is not set in stone. In
fact, under the agreement each member state is permitted to charge a tariff
of up to thirty-five percent on a very limited number of imports; these tarrifs
are merely required to be reduced to below twenty percent by 2001.13
.24 See Thomas O'Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in any Future Negotiations Between
Mercosur and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 14 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L
& COMP. L. 304, 308 (1997).
'2 See id.
126 See id.
'27 See Jeb Blount, Protectionism, Latin Style, Mercosur Trade (visited Sept. 1997)
<http://www.latintrade.com/march97/protectionism.html> at 1.
' See id. at 2.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 1.
131 See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 15.
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Accordingly, tariffs have occasionally been increased by the member
countries. In November of 1997, the presidents of Brazil and Argentina
mutually agreed to raise the CET by three percent. 132 While this move
was primarily a national decision by Argentina, it applied across the region
and has caused many to question the "open regionalism" of Mercosur
towards the rest of the world.
33
Furthermore, recent World Bank research has shown that Mercosur as a
region imposed additional barriers against imports from non-members above
and beyond the CET resulting in a trade distortion." 4  These external
barriers encouraged companies in the Mercosur countries to make capital
intensive goods which could have been bought less expensively outside the
region. 31 Mercosur officials, however, have contended that such research
was incorrect, faulting the "heavy influence by the car-industry sector in
which Argentina and Brazil have indeed imposed high barriers to imports of
automobiles from third countries."'' 36 They label these as the exception,
rather than the Mercosur rule.
137
Mercosur's attempts to broaden the regime might dispel some suspicion
of Mercosur's status as a protectionist fortress of regional trade. However,
simply because Mercosur is looking at new members does not necessarily
signify that it is more amiable to non-members. Despite its size, Mercosur
as a region has the potential to shut out the rest of the world and hide behind
regional protectionist bunkers through the use of the CET and other tariff
and non-tariff measures. This is arguably as easy as raising a percentage
rate, which has been done and can be done again, if the bombardment of
world competition becomes too vexatious.
B. Protection by the Individual States
The allegation that Mercosur as a region has become a fortress which
diverts trade from the outside world is questionable. That Mercosur, as a
group of individual states, is still riddled with national protectionist policies
132 See The Free-Trade Winds Die Away, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 1997, at 35,
available in 1997 WL 17832371.
1 See id.
3' See Finance and Economics: Murky Mercosur: Trade Agreements, THE ECONOMIST,
July 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8136899.
133 See id.
'36 See id.
137 See id.
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may be more accurate. Despite remarkable steps taken in lieu of trade
liberalization, each member state has, in its own way and to its own degree,
held on to (or implemented) its own individual policies designed to protect
its national market. This selective protectionism has been implemented
either by use of the existing Mercosur agreement, by way of exceptions to
both the common external tariff and remaining inter-region tariffs, or by
other non-tariff measures. Shifting products in and out of the CET,
unilateral application of tariffs, use of quotas, applying individual rules in
place of Mercosur rules, national tax systems and penalties, and numerous
forms of red tape are among the various methods used by each of the
Mercosur countries to protect national interests and markets.
For instance, Brazil, the dominant member of Mercosur, has truly
championed the liberalization of trade and the opening of markets.
Nevertheless, Brazil, perhaps more than the other countries, has on numerous
occasions resorted to the use of various safeguarding measures to protect
certain sectors of its economy since the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion.
As previously mentioned, under the Treaty of Asuncion each country was
allowed to exempt certain products from the CET (Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay listed 300 items, Paraguay listed 399 items) and intra-region tariff
system (goods subject to final adequacy). 38  As Brazil has proven,
however, the CET (or, for that matter, the rules established under Mercosur)
is in no way unchangeable. By taking advantage of the relative ease with
which it may move an item in and out of the tariff structures, Brazil has
exposed the soft underbelly of the trade agreement. In July 1994, for
example, Brazil raised tariffs on the imports of toys from twenty percent to
seventy percent. 39  The seventy percent tariff was in effect for a two-
hundred day period which conveniently covered the peak seasons for such
products, including the Latin American holiday Children's Day and
Christmas. 40 "The rise in the tariff on toys was imposed under interna-
tional rules that allow such a safeguard if a national industry suffers severe
damage from a sudden rise in imports.' 41 Regardless of the legal backing,
131 See supra p. 398.
139 Protectionist? What, Us? Brazil's Modem Protectionism, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 3, 1996
available in 1996 WL 11246995 [hereinafter Protectionist? What, Us?].
'40 See id.
I" d. Currently the tariff on toy imports is at sixty-three percent, which is, in all
likelihood, a direct response to business leaders fear of a "US economic invasion." Anthony
Faiola, Brazilians Wary of U.S. Trade Pact; Businesses Fear Dropped Barriers Could
Damage Recovering Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1997 at A24.
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the willingness and ability to unilaterally impose duties on imports stands as
strong evidence of the continued presence of protectionist policies.
In addition, by moving items in and out of the CET set by Mercosur, the
governments of Brazil (and the remaining countries) have also contrived to
raise duties on import wines, peaches, paper, and gypsum."' In a time
where tariffs are supposedly being lowered, Brazil has and continues to put
up various barriers, showing a reluctance towards full liberalization of trade.
This reluctance is partly based on a sensitive economy, a growing trade
deficit, and fears that the U.S. and other outside countries will either run
Brazilian companies into extinction or come between the regional partners
in Mercosur' 43 The legitimacy of such fears not only supports their
hesitancy to move ahead, but also stands as a witness that protectionist
sentiment is in no way a thing of the past.
Nowhere has this concept been found to be more true than in the
automobile industry. For example, in 1996 Brazil imposed rules requiring
extra duties of up to seventy percent upon cars imported into Brazil from
firms without manufacturing plants in Brazil."' Firms with manufacturing
plants within Brazil were allowed to continue importing at thirty-five
percent. 14
Although concessions were made and Brazil conceded to exempt
Mercosur-made cars from the increased tariff, these are small steps in a time
of great talk. This has resulted in requirements that, until the year 2000,
firms with plants in Argentina and Brazil must balance their overall trade of
cars and components between the two countries (goods go duty-free provided
they have sixty percent Mercosur content).'" This solution was largely the
142 See Protectionist? What, Us?, supra note 139. The notion that the tariffs raised by
Brazil on such items are to be regarded as protectionist measures is generally undisputed.
The 1994 tariff increase on toys came as a result of previous decreases on imported toys
which almost completely destroyed the Brazilian toy industry. More than 520 domestic toy
factories were forced to close within 24 months and more than 15,000 workers lost their jobs.
The unilateral tariff increases reflect a general Brazilian sentiment towards trade liberalization;
Brazil is not ready. While many of the larger corporations are enjoying unprecedented
success from a liberalized market and an ability to trade more freely, many small and medium
size industries are urging political leaders to be cautious. See Faiola, supra note 141, at A24.
143 See Faiola, supra note 141, at A24.
'" See Michael Reid, A Survey of Mercosur: Business Gears Up-Multi-Nationals are
Leading the Way in the Wider Market But Local Firms are Joining Them, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11247180.
145 See id
'46 See id. at 1.
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result of a compromise between the two countries, however plants with firms
only in Argentina have a quota for exports to Brazil as well as a thirty-five
percent tariff.'47 Thus, Brazil conceded to throw a half-step backwards
into its two steps forward.
Similarly, automakers in Argentina recently petitioned the government to
modify plans for a common Mercosur auto regime by retaining quota norms
in an effort to protect regional producers from imports. 4 This petition
came in response to a recent agreement by the Mercosur countries regarding
the auto regime, setting a common, quota-free import tariff of thirty-five
percent during a four year transitional phase beginning in 2000.149
Additionally, in response to concerns over fiscal and balance-of-payments
deficits in developing countries after the Mexican crisis, Argentina imposed
a general three percent duty on imports from outside Mercosur, and raised
its tariffs on capital goods and telecom equipment.1 50  Likewise, Chile's
entry into Mercosur was accompanied by an offshore tariff set at a flat
eleven percent rate while other Mercosur countries follow rates ranging from
zero to twenty percent.' 5'
By effectively manipulating the current tariff structure according to their
will and pleasure, Mercosur countries can talk the talk without having to
completely walk the walk. Instead of the great and obvious barriers of the
past, Brazil and the other Mercosur countries use unilateral tariffs as
selective protectionism to safeguard their market and industries from outside
competition.
Another tool used to protect the markets has been the use of quotas
(which, if classified as a "Safeguard Quota" under the rules of Mercosur,
were not to be used past December 31, 1994, but they appear to be
permissible for extra-zone trade). For example, in June 1994, "Brazil
announced that for three years it would impose quotas on textile imports
from China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Panama."' 52  These
quotas were likely imposed to shield an industry, already considered sensitive
47 See id.
4' Argentine automakers press government to retain quotas under new Mercosur Regime,
AFX, Dec. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23085075 [hereinafter Quota Retention].
149 See id.
"S' What Mercosur has done, Survey & Seminars on Brazil (visited Sept. 9, 1997)
<http://www.demon.co.uk/Itamaraty/mercosur02.html>.
151 Mercosur, Historical Background (visited Oct. 20, 1997)
http://www.americasnet.conmauritz/mercosur/english/page02.html>.
152 See Protectionist? What, Us?, supra note 139.
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due to strong competition from Argentina, from further threatened dan-
ger. 1
53
The use of such measures is compounded by the fact that Mercosur as a
region appears to tolerate such actions. By allowing a country to individual-
ly raise trade barriers through the imposition of tariffs preempted by
Mercosur tariff schedules, Mercosur provides a roundabout way for its
member countries to continue sheltering certain products. Indeed, the ability
possessed by each of the countries to raise tariffs unilaterally or to move
products in and out of the CET and the intra-region tariffs implies that
strands of protectionism are running throughout the liberalization efforts of
both the countries and the region. Unless uniform rules established under
the Treaty of Asuncion are strictly enforced, Mercosur as a region will
further incubate the protectionist sentiment of its member countries that is
already alive and thriving on its own.
1. Other Ways and Means, Non-tariff Measures
Since "protectionism" has become a dirty word in Latin America,
particularly among Mercosur proponents, many Latin American countries
seek ways to protect their economy so that no one can call them protection-
ists, at least under treaty obligations. By way of non-tariff measures,
Mercosur countries continue to safeguard sensitive areas without name-
calling. Of the non-tariff measures, the most popular include licensing,
paratariffs, anti-dumping or countervailing measures, and variable levies.'
54
Other non-tariff measures against imports include: reference prices, customs
valuation procedures, supplementary and even discriminatory charges on
imports, technical barriers, and government procurement procedures. 55
Traditional non-tariff measures ("NTM's") "were typically broad based
licensing systems, affecting all imports and supported by strict foreign-
exchange controls."' 56  By requiring nearly all imports to have a prior
license, authorities used the license applications to check on the expected
level of imports. 157 The applications provided a comprehensive administra-
153 Id.
15 See Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 195,
206 (1995).
' See id. at 206.
'5 See id. at 205.
157 See id.
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tive control by which imports could be quickly curtailed when required.'
In Brazil, non-automatic licensing by way of local content regulations and
export-performance requirements have been effective in controlling
imports."' For example, at a time where Brazilian imports were at U.S.
$20.9 million, the percentage of imports subject to non-automatic licensing
was nearly twenty-one percent.' 6 Undoubtedly, this had the effect of
discouraging imports that fell subject to such requirements, and thus
protected certain national goods.
As noted, the decrease in tariff and non-tariff measures has led to an
increase in the substitute means by which markets are protected. As tariff
and non-tariff barriers have fallen, there has been an increase in the use of
anti-dumping and countervailing actions. These actions are designed to
protect markets from unfair trading practices such as dumping or strong
subsidization, but are frequently used as protectionist mechanisms.
Although anti-dumping has not been used by the Mercosur states any more
than it has been used among other Latin American countries or even the
United States, it is, nonetheless, a tool by which protectionist policies have
been forwarded. In fact, the Brazilian Government recently set out to
attempt to solve anti-dumping claims by Argentinean manufacturers against
a Brazilian steel exporter whose alleged dumping activities were adversely
affecting Argentinean laminated products.' 6'
In addition, there has been a general move in Latin America away from
volume-control measures towards greater use of price control and monitoring
measures. Mercosur countries have used price systems as a way of
protecting certain sensitive products. 62 For example, Uruguay has made
great use of reference price systems and minimum export prices.' 63 By
establishing lower price references for local goods, Uruguay sought to
encourage consumption of national goods over the higher-indexed foreign
product. Unfortunately, these systems worked to distort consumption and
production behaviors in a detrimental fashion."
1' See id. at 206.
159 See id.
'60 See id. at 208.
161 See Gazeta Mercantil, Brazil and Argentina to Settle Disputes in Mercosur Court,
Chemical Business Newsbase Nov. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2187192.
162 See Laird, supra note 154, at 208.
163 See id.
'6 See id.
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Another non-tariff measure used to protect domestic markets is the use of
supplementary and discriminatory charges on imports. These ad valorem or
specific charges, applied to imports include: consular charges; port charges
often unrelated to port costs; stamp taxes; statistical taxes that do not always
produce timely statistics;"6 and freight taxes levied on the freight costs of
imports." These supplementary charges, although unrelated to tariffs,
often have the same guardian effect as tariffs, as the ad valorem incidence
of supplementary charges can exceed the ad valorem incidence of the tariff
itself.167 In Brazil, for example, the tax incidence of the Industrialized
Products Tax and the Merchandise Circulation Tax ("ICMS") amounted to
one hundred percent of an automobile in 1995 while the customs duty was
a remarkably lower fifty percent. 68 Indeed, there is still a wide range of
trade-related taxes and charges throughout the Mercosur region, including
some domestic taxes applied discriminatorily against imports. 69 These
charges are not tariffs, but have the same effect, making the import more
expensive than the local item on the local market. An example can be found
in Mercosur's associate member, Chile, where Scotch whiskey, an imported
product, is nearly thirty percent more expensive than Pisco, the locally made
spirit. 7 ' This price disparity is due to domestic liquor tax structures
favoring local production over imported liquors.' 7' As long as these
charges and taxes can be unilaterally and indiscriminately applied by the
member states, conflicts between the states will be inevitable. How the
members of Mercosur choose to deal with these will depend largely upon
165 See id. at 209. Taxes and charges levied at the frontier, other than tariffs, also have
become a large scale issue. These first surfaced when Argentina unilaterally increased the
statistical tax from three percent to ten percent even against other Mercosur Members. See
id. at 219.
'6 See id. at 210.
167 See id.
'68 See id. The breakdown of the supplementary charges related to the following: 1) port
services, 50% of the cost of services; 2) the port improvement tax, 3% of the c.i.f. value; 3)
the merchant marine renewal tax, 25% of the c.i.f. value on the first landing and 20% on
subsequent landings; 4) an import license fee, 1.8% of the f.o.b. value; 5) a syndicate fee,
2.2% of the c.i.f. value; 6) a brokerage fee, 1% of the c.i.f. value; 7) a fee for printing forms,
a flat US $17; 8) an administration commission, 1.5% of the c.i.f. value; 9) a 5% airport tax;
10) a fee for handling charges; and 11) a social benefits contribution of 10% of warehouse
charges. See id.
169 See id. at 219.
170 See Blount, supra note 127.
"' See id.
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their willingness to abandon such measures and move away from protection-
ism towards truly liberalized trade.
In addition, technical barriers are often used to keep out-of-date articles
from being sold in developing countries when they can no longer be sold by
the exporters of industrialized countries in their home market.'72 A
country can effectively use the technical restriction of classifying an item as
out-of date, to promote protective purposes. Use of out-of-date classification
has been directed primarily against the import of goods from other Latin
American countries but it is rarely effective against a technologically
superior country.
2. Administrative Shortcomings
While Mercosur makes explicit provisions for consultations regarding
economic policies, there nonetheless exist administrative deficiencies.1
73
Many of these inefficiencies are due to the member states' reluctance to yield
full administrative control to a supranational Mercosur body.
It is important to emphasize that the Treaty of Asuncion lacks a fully
developed institutional structure capable of effectuating a fully functioning
common market.174 The Treaty of Asuncion merely laid down the general,
broad guidelines for establishing such a common market, and left the
specifics to later agreements which were to be signed by the member
states. 75  While many of these shortcomings have been addressed, there
still remain several gaps in legal structure of Mercosur, due to the states'
reluctance to surrender power to Mercosur, which contributes to national
protectionist sentiments held by each member country.
Critics agree that the weakness of Mercosurs' institutions, combined with
the relative economic and political instability of the dominating country,
Brazil, have made the goal of a common market unattainable, at least in the
short run. 76  This lack of administrative strength both affects and is
affected by protectionist policies. Because the relatively weak administrative
172 See Laird, supra note 154, at 210.
'"See Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration
and an Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 850, 850 (1996-97).
174 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 425.
s See O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 14.
76ee Kenneth W. Abbot & Gregory W. Bownan, Economic Integration in the Americas,
"A Work in Progress," 14 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 493, 499 (1994).
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bodies do not have the power to execute the regulations and policies
established under Mercosur, Mercosur must rely completely upon the
executory powers of each state and, consequently, the willingness of each
state to enforce these measures. In addition, the unwillingness of each state
to cede sufficient administrative powers to a Supranational Mercosur body
can most likely be traced to a general nationalistic sentiment.
Though opinions differ, it is generally held that it is necessary to pass
national laws, directives, or resolutions to give legislative or regulatory effect
to the mandates of Mercosur in the party state's territories. 77 Only the
Paraguayan Constitution of 1992 and the Argentinean Constitution, as
modified in August 1994, recognize the transfererice of competency and
jurisdiction to the suprastate Mercosur organization. 178 This was to only
be applied under equal and reciprocal conditions with the rest of the party
states. Although Mercosur countries have, for the most part, been resolute
in the implementation of legislation, the ability for a state legislature to reject
Mercosur legislation manifests strong sentiment that Mercosur standards will
apply secondarily to national laws.
Another area where an inadequate structure has been troublesome is the
integration of the economic sectors. As with similar insufficiencies in
administration, structural weaknesses, perhaps caused by the member states
reluctance to yield power and control to Mercosur, have led to troubling
circumstances in which states have reverted to trade refuge.'79 As previ-
ously mentioned, there is potential hazard within the economic sector or
within those enterprises that have been competing beyond their national
borders yet inside the borders of the common market.8 The danger is
that these companies may destroy each other unless means to harmonize
them are implemented. Without question, increased competition among
industries presents a threat to those businesses which cannot compete. It also
presents a catalyst for retreat to protectionist policies.
For example, competition between Brazilian and north-center Argentine
sugar and further competition between Argentine wheat and that of Parana,
Brazil has spawned unilateral action by national governments seeking to
'77 Ana Maria De Aguinis, Can Mercosur Accede to NAFTA? A Legal Perspective, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 597, 603 (1995).
178 See Cherie O'Neal Taylor, supra note 173, at 871 n.98.
179 See Raul Anibal Etcheverry, The Mercosur: Business Enterprise Organization and
Joint Ventures, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 979, 986 (1995).
'8 id. at 986.
[Vol. 27:389
NEOPROTECTIONIST MEASURES IN MERCOSUR
defend local manufacturers.' Competition in both of these industries
came to head in 1997, as the Argentine Congress conditioned the reduction
of tariffs on sugar until Brazil stopped subsidizing its sugar alcohol
industry.8 2 Brazil immediately reacted by threatening to establish addi-
tional tariffs on Argentine wheat.8 3 Tensions continued to flare surround-
ing the recent Rio de Janeiro Summit where first attempts failed to produce
an agreement on free sugar trade."8 When an agreement which gave
Brazil a ten percent reduction of the Argentine tariff was ultimately met,
angry Argentine sugar producers accused their government of going back on
their own policy and giving preference to Brazil. 185  Such nationalistic
policies to inter-regional trade are an impediment to Mercosur progress and
show that protectionist sentiment is a viable force within the region.
3. Red Tape
Above and beyond the use of tariff and non-tariff measures exists a lack
of structural harmonization, which is perhaps a more realistic indicator of
how strong a force protectionism remains within the region. Each country
has its own degree of red tape that importers must cut through in order to
facilitate trade with other member countries.
For example, a Brazilian firm wishing to export chickens to Argentina
must first obtain a certificate of sanitation from Brazil's health ministry. 86
'at See id. at 986.
182 See Argentina and Brazil Clash Over Sugar Policy, MERCOPRESS, Sept. 13, 1997, at
1. Argentinean law provided for a non-bloc tariff on sugar from Brazil due to heavy
subsidization to the tune of $3 billion a year stimulating sugar production and helping to
make Brazil the world's largest exporter of sugar and one of the world's largest producers.
See id.; see also Marcela Valente, Trade-Latam: Argentine Sugar Producers Defend Tariffs,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19901993.
183 Argentina and Brazil Clash Over Sugar Policy, supra note 182, at 1. Sugar and wheat
were not the only problem. In the months preceding the December 1998 summit, Argentina
threatened to raise taxes on some Brazilian products, such as steel, due to claimed dumping
practices by Brazil. See Mercosur Summit Prepares to Open as Trade Spats Continue,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16654132.
184 See Argentina, Brazil Fail to Agree on Free Sugar Trade, XINHUA ENGLISH
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19500469. Argentina had recently placed
a twenty-two percent tariff on Brazilian sugar to combat Brazilian subsidies. See id.
185 See Valente, supra note 182.
18 See Michael Reid, A Survey of Mercosur: The Road to a Single-Market, Mercosur
Needs Less Red Tape But More Common Rules, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 11247185.
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However, upon reaching the border, the chickens must again be inspected by
both of Argentina's health and agriculture ministries. 187 These inspections,
depending on the presence of such officials, can take up to two days, which
are days that come off the products shelf-life. 88 The Brazilian firm might
also have to pay Argentina's value added taxi89 Furthermore, if the firm
is selling to an import wholesaler, it would have to pay neither in Argentine
or Brazilian currency but in U.S. dollars, which could require a tenuous
currency exchange at a Brazilian bank.' 9
Red tape is not, however, unique to Argentina. In Brazil importers can
wait up to six months for a sanitary certificate.' 9 Similarly, the Brazilian
government recently announced plans to impose health-based restrictions on
the importation of such goods as food, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.1 92
Such news was met with disapproval by other Mercosur countries who
criticized such a measure as being against free trade principles.
In addition, due to inadequacies of infrastructure, the IDB has found that
in the Mercosur countries a journey of 100 kilometers (sixty-two miles) that
crosses any frontier costs forty percent more that one that does not. 93
While most large firms have been able to find ways around these
problems, smaller companies have had to deal with these inadequacies, and
have not seen any real benefits of trade liberalization. It is the failure to
coordinate these procedures and provide answers to such problems that
reflects an unwillingness to concede trade control to Mercosur. Failure to
introduce a single customs document and rules of mutual recognition,
whether due to reluctance or just languorousness, is a telltale sign that the
countries of Mercosur maintain protection over their markets. By failing to
harmonize, or by implementing additional procedures and charges, the
countries continue to forward such measures designed to shield products and
markets from outside competition.
Coupled with unharmonized procedure, there has been a lack of coordina-
tion among each member's policies. While Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay are members of the Interamerican Convention on Conflicts of Laws
187 See id.
188 See id.
'89 See id.
'90 See id.
191 See id.
'92 See Brazil to Impose Restrictions on Some Mercosur Imports, AFX NEWS SOURCE,
Oct. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 15905400.
'9' See Reid, supra note 186.
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Regarding Business Companies and as such have less stringent requirements
for business registration, 94 Brazil, who is not a member of this pact,
demands federal authorization for a foreign enterprise or branch (whether
belonging to Mercosur or not) to do business in its territory.1 95  The
treatment given to enterprises of "Brazilian" origin is different than that
which applies to any foreign enterprise, be it from the Mercosur or from
other regions.196  Lack of coordination among such policies coupled with
a general inability to enforce uniformity allows Brazil to protect various
enterprises. For example, the Brazilian constitution grants a certain
monopoly to the "Brazilian enterprises" in activities such as accession to
public credit and promotion systems." 7
While free practice of economic activity is ensured independently from
government authorization, exceptional cases exist under Article 121 of the
Brazilian Constitution extending preferential treatment to different types of
Brazilian enterprises.19 8  In the acquisition of goods or services, the
government must give preferential treatment to the Brazilian enterprises of
national capital as determined by law.19 Brazilian enterprises of national
capital are those enterprises under permanent effective control of physical
persons domiciled or residing in the country or of entities of domestic public
law. 200 Furthermore, under Article 173, certain economic activities are
kept under national jurisdiction when national security reasons or a
"9 In fact very few formalities are required from countries abroad to perform isolated acts.
See Etcheverry, supra note 179.
'9' See id. at 9.88.
19% Id. at 988; Brazilian Enterprises are defined as "those created under Brazilian Law and
with their central office and administration in the country." Id. at 990; Brazil also applies the
combined definition of creation to the site of management and the site of creation. By adding
the requirement of nationality, it distinguishes the Brazilian enterprise and the partners of
nationality, see id. at 990.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id. at 991. The Brazilian Constitution draws a distinction between a "Brazilian
Company of Domestic Capital," in which the ownership of the majority of the voting shares
and rights is held by Brazilian residents, and a Brazilian Company of Foreign Capital. See,
Ester Nunes, Brazilian Country Update: A Review of the New Order, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1,
63 (1995).
20 Effective Enterprise control means that such persons or entities hold the majority of
the company's capital with the right to vote or the right to exercise the power of decision to
manage its activities. See Etcheverry, supra note 179, at 990.
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fundamental interest for the community are at stake. 20 ' These measures
allow Brazil to control certain economic areas without relinquishing control
to Mercosur. Thus, Brazil, not Mercosur, is granted the right to plan the
economic policy of the country.20
2
Mercosur also lacks provisions to open up trade in services. 2 3 Particu-
larly, Mercosur needs region-wide financial services to take on such
important areas as the harmonization of tax and of macroeconomic policies
(which thus far have extended no further than the exchange of informa-
tion).2' In the area of banking this is made particularly evident. While
the central banks of the member countries have held preliminary talks
regarding harmonizing bank regulatory systems, and finance officials have
discussed tax regimes, the differences between the systems of each country
continue to create hurdles to which few have endeavored to surmount.20 5
This can be seen in Brazil's middling effort to accept banks from other
Mercosur countries. 206 Although Brazil has allowed other banks to enter,
it has yet to allow a full-scale financial opening or a freeing of trade in
services and will be unlikely to do so until its stabilization program and
economic reforms are consolidated.2 7 In addition, Mercosur rejected a
Chilean request to include trade in services in its association agreement. 208
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, Mercosur still lacks a viable
mechanism for dispute resolution. 209 The 1991 Mercosur agreement drew
up a procedure which called for disputes to be submitted to an ad hoc
arbitration tribunal under the control of the Common Market Group.210
However, this has yet to be adequately tested. In practice, most disputes
between member countries have been settled politically by the Mercosur
20' See id. at 991. See also Nunes, supra note 199, at 62 (noting that the Brazilian
Constitution restricts foreign participation in areas such as exploration ad production of
petroleum, cabotage, and shipping of merchandise, newspapers, magazines, television and
radio networks, fishing industry, post office, telephone and telegraph, aerospace, banking,
mining, and insurance).
2 See Etcheverry, supra note 179, at 991.
2 See Haines-Ferrari, supra note 9, at 425-26.
2" See Reid, supra note 186.
20S See id.
2 See id.
20 See id.
28 See id.
2 See O'Neal Taylor, supra note 173, at 860-62.
210 See Reid, supra note 186.
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presidents and private claims have been funneled through the group to
national tribunals.2 ' Without a tested and politically neutral dispute-
settlement mechanism or a Mercosur tribunal, the Mercosur countries
effectively discourage investors who undoubtedly lack confidence in the
ability to remedy potential problems. The failure to harmonize and unify
economic policies and control stands as an obstacle towards the attainment
of a true common market and serves as a reminder of the difficulty of
abandoning trade policies held tightly for decades past.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most people assert that even in light of such arguably "protectionist"
measures, Mercosur has made tremendous headway in terms of opening its
markets and shedding protectionist policies. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe
renounces accusations that Mercosur is evolving into a protectionist trade
fortress by evaluating the progress which has been made. He claims that
the protectionist label is "especially laughable" when viewed in light of the
genuinely protectionist policies that were prevalent throughout the region at
the beginning of the decade.2 3 O'Keefe points to Brazilian import duties
on personal computers, which were around 103 percent in 1991, and are
currently around 30 percent.21 4 Others point to the incredible growth in
bilateral trade which has grown from $1.5 billion in the eighties to over $14
billion in 1997.215
Despite the incontestable merit of these reductions, the true test of whether
Mercosur is really a free trade regime will not be found in reductions from
100 percent tariffs to thirteen percent tariffs, but in Mercosur's ability to go
from thirteen percent to zero tariffs. It will be interesting to see if Brazil can
reduce its tariff on personal computers down to fourteen percent by 2004
when the Mercosur CET on computers takes place. Even O'Keefe, one of
Mercosur's greatest proponents, agrees that there exist certain policies
pursued by some of the member states which indicate reluctance to fully
213 See Controversy Settling Systems (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://www.americasnet.com/mauritztmercosur/english/page 10.html>.
232 See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, The Mercosur Success Story. (Latin American regional
trade agreement), LATIN FINANCE 74, Jan. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10930643.
213 Id.
214 See id.
25 See Mercosur News, (visited Jan 17, 1998) <http://www.falkland-malvinas.com>.
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open their markets.216
The months leading up to and culminating with the December 1998 Rio
de Janeiro Summit highlighted this reluctance. Economic difficulties in Asia
and throughout the world sent chills throughout Mercosur and contributed to
trade disputes and tensions between the Mercosur member nations.2 7 In
what the Brazilian press claimed to be a "tariff war" between Argentina and
Brazil,218 the countries were divided as to whether or not to opt for
protectionist policies." 9 Brazil accused Argentina of secretly selling milk
from New Zealand,220 Argentina claimed Brazil was subsidizing sugar and
neither country wanted the other's cars. 22' Nevertheless, representatives
from both countries attempted to diffuse such accusations by claiming that
protectionist measures were a normal response to international difficulties
and that these measures would not affect Mercosur trade.222
Contrary to Argentina and Brazil's assurances, protectionist sentiment held
previous to the December summit was affecting Mercosur trade and
continued to affect trade negotiations at the summit. While the countries
were able to come to an agreement in some areas, little progress was actually
made.223 An agreement was reached by the auto industries to begin
phasing in free trade through the imposition of a thirty-five percent import
tariff on vehicles made outside the trade block during the four year transition
period beginning in January 2000.224 Brazil currently maintains a forty-
2,6 See O'Keefe, supra note 212.
217 See Trade Tensions Beset Mercosur, ABIX (Australasian News Abstracts), Dec. 8,
1998, available in 1998 WL 18225304.
218 See Claude E. Erbsen, Brazil: Trade Dispute Not 'Tariff War' Says Mercosur Won't
be Affected, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 1998, at A33, available in 1998 WL 7810997.
219 See id.
220 See Harold Amos, South America Free Trade Hits Snags, AP ONLINE, Dec. 5, 1998
available in 1998 WL 23508442.
221 See id.
222 See Brazil: Trade Discrepancies Continue with Argentina, SOUTH AMERICAN
BUSINESS INFORMATION, Nov. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21550861 (claiming that the
frequent trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil may intensify). In November 1998,
Argentina's economic minister complained about poor trade relations with Brazil, claiming
that "in terms of trade (they) (were) not at a good moment with Brazil." Trade Relations
With Brazil Not "Good" Says, Argentina Minister, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Nov. 15, 1998,
available in, 1998 WL 16639468.
m See Thierry Ogier, Small Progress Made on Mercosur Auto Tariffs, J. COMMERCE,
Dec. 11, 1998 at 3A, available in, 1998 WL 20947318.
224 See id.
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nine percent tax on imports from manufacturers who do not have a
production base within the country. 225 The countries further agreed that
no new tax breaks or subsidies will be offered to lure auto-makers into the
region without the consent of the other Mercosur members.226 In addition,
Argentina and Brazil signed a memorandum of understanding regarding
sugar tariffs. The memorandum allowed Brazil a ten percent reduction on
Argentina's tariff.
227
Despite these steps, tensions and hesitancy towards progress remained.
Immediately following the agreement, Argentine automakers pressed their
government to modify the summit agreement and retain quotas to protect
regional producers, 2 ' and sugar producers criticized the government's
decision to allow Brazil a reduction on Argentina's tariff. Apparently,
Mercosur countries are still holding on to the protectionist sentiment of the
past and are hesitant to move further towards free trade. With regards to the
auto sector, it remains to be seen whether the countries will be able to reduce
tariffs below the thirty-five percent level as planned. Therein lies the true
test.
Moreover, as Mercosur continues to deal with internal "broadening," it is
ever faced with the possibility of "widening," particularly in the wake of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to be implemented over the next
seven years. As it is generally held that hemispheric trade will come by way
of expanding regional blocks rather than through multilateral efforts,
Mercosur will indeed play a crucial role in this evolution of free trade.229
In fact, with the recent growth and apparent strength of the Mercosur block,
many argue that any efforts to unite the hemisphere will be by way of other
regimes joining Mercosur. For example, Peru and Mexico are presently
courting the Secretariat in Montevideo. Moreover, Boliva and Venezuela,
as members of the Andean Pact, have expressed their intentions of joining
the project.23 Some contend that NAFTA will be the core or foundation
for eventual free trade throughout the Americas, and Mercosur, while being
22 See id.
226 See Global Automotive Report: Four South American Countries Explore Free Vehicle
Trade, THE DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 11, 1998, at B3, available in 1998 WL 23632164.
227 See Valente, supra note 182.
22 See Quota Retention, supra note 148.
229 See Wolff, supra note 3, at 114.
2See Roundup, AFX NEWS, Dec. 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23083102; Mercosur
Will Cover All South America by 1998 MERCOPRESS NEWS AGENCY (visited Dec. 11, 1997)
<http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni2190697.html>.
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a core for South American Free Trade, by remaining under the dominance
and leadership of NAFTA and the U.S., will be merely a pole for hemispher-
ic free trade.3
Nevertheless, Mercosur's ability to champion hemispheric trade as a core
or a pole, will depend largely on its ability to take the remaining steps
necessary to shake the protectionist sentiment. For example, whether Brazil
will likely embrace expansion beyond the current Mercosur group depends
largely on its ability to feel more self-confident in light of recent economic
instability. Brazil's refusal to integrate trade with such countries as the U.S.
might present the possible dilemma for Argentina of choosing between
continuing its membership in Mercosur, or attempting to join with the United
States and NAFTA.232 Even if expansion of Mercosur takes place, the
remaining protectionist factors presented in this note will still remain a
obstacle to true free trade, both within the Mercosur region and with the rest
of the world.
Mercosur, as a region has taken tremendous strides towards the liberaliza-
tion of trade. Nevertheless, there remains a difficult road ahead, laden with
hurdles, arguably more difficult to overcome than the notable steps
heretofore taken. Like many a twelve-step program, the first step towards
overcoming the protectionist problem will be to admit that there is a
problem. Once protectionist measures are acknowledged, maybe then can
Mercosur tackle the difficult task of becoming a true free trade regime.
However, if protectionism continues to be swept under the rug, Mercosur
may never realize the full benefit of its trade liberalization efforts.
231 See Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 950-53 (1996).
232 See Edward C. Snyder, Comment, The Menum Revolution in Argentina: Progress
Toward A Hemisphere Free Trade Area, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 95, 117-18 (1994).
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